Empirical studies have documented that rms that report more conservatively are charged a lower interest rate. Following these empirical ndings, there has been a debate over the rationale and economic consequences of accounting conservatism. In this paper, we attempt to shed some light on this debate. We argue that the prospect of signaling project return may give rise to the demand for conservative accounting, even though it may not necessarily improve contracting eciency ex post. This suggests that the negative correlation between interest rates and conservative accounting may be explained by the heterogeneity among rms, such as riskiness, leverage ratio and the strength of balance sheet. By incorporating eort decisions, we show that eort ineciency may result from non-contractible eorts and from asymmetric payo structures between debtholders and equityholders. Finally, our results indicate that conditional conservatism may either alleviate or amplify the distortion required for signaling purpose.
Introduction
Empirical studies have suggested that rms that report more conservatively are charged a lower interest rate, have conservative covenant modications and are more likely to have smaller bid-ask spreads in the debt markets (see Ahmed and Standford-harris (2002) , Armstrong et al. (2009) , Zhang (2008) , and the references cited therein). Watts (2003) attributes these ndings to higher eciency of debt contracting. He argues that, because of the asymmetric payos in a debt contract, debtholders benet from more timely loss recognition than from timely gain recognition. Thus, accounting conservatism may improve the eciency of debt contracting, which in turn gives rise to lower interest rates.
In an inuential paper, Gigler et al. (2009) analyze the link between accounting conservatism and the eciency of debt contracting. They illustrate that accounting conservatism may diminish the information content of an accounting system. A more conservative accounting system increases the expected cost of incorrectly liquidating a protable project, but reduces the expected cost of excessive optimism. When the former eect is stronger than the latter one, the eciency of debt contracts may be lower as a result of accounting conservatism. Moreover, they show that a lower interest rate and the frequency of passing decision rights to debtholders are substitutes, suggesting that such a negative association does not result from higher eciency of debt contracting.
This study intends to provide theoretical grounds for such empirical ndings. Specically, we argue that conservative accounting can be a signaling device to convey a rm's private information in order to raise external capital. This signaling incentive may provide another rationale for why rms that report conservatively are charged a lower interest rate. To elaborate on this, consider a debt covenant that might trigger liquidation when future accounting information reveals bad news before the maturity of debt. Reporting conservatively results in a higher chance of liquidation, which is costly because rms are unlikely to retain any value from it. More importantly, it may be more costly for more risky rms with weaker balance sheet, because they are more vulnerable to the covenant violation and thus cannot aord using conservative reporting to raise a debt. This suggests that in the presence of information asymmetry, less risky rms with stronger nancial positions can utilize conservative accounting to distinguish itself from weaker rms. In this aspect, our study complements Gigler et al. (2009) by examining the eect of accounting conservatism when residual claimants have private information about future project return. Our analysis suggests that the negative correlation between lower interest rates and conservative accounting may be explained by the heterogeneity (riskiness) of rms'project quality.
To analytically demonstrate this argument, we build on the model by Gigler et al. (2009) and Innes (1990) in which an entrepreneur owns an investment project and seeks for capital funding from an debtholder. The project is risky and the entrepreneur is privileged with private information about the project return. Facing such an adverse selection problem, the entrepreneur can only rely on an accounting system that generates informative but noisy signals for the project return. The entrepreneur is allowed to to choose the degrees of accounting conservatism when contracting with the debtholder, which determines the correlation between the accounting signal and the project return. If the interim accounting signal is not favorable, the control right of the project will be shifted to the debtholder who then may write o the project before actual project outcome is realized.
We show that the prospect of signaling project return may give rise to the demand for conservative accounting, even though it may not necessarily improve contracting eciency ex post. Specically, the less risky entrepreneur chooses a more conservative accounting system in order to signal her type. In this model, the more conservative accounting system is, the more likely an unfavorable (low) signal will be released. As the debtholder may choose to liquidate the project upon receiving a low accounting report, it is then more costly for the more risky entrepreneur to commit accounting conservatism than for the less risky one.
Our analysis further demonstrates that entrepreneurs reporting conservative accounting tend to show the following characteristics. When the amount of capital borrowing is higher, entrepreneurs need to commit more conservative accounting, suggesting that conservatism is positively correlated with leverage. An entrepreneur with a less risky project tends to choose more conservative accounting to signal its private information. All else being equal, tangible assets tend be less risky and have a higher liquidation value. It is shown that investors request a lower repayment when investment projects are funded more by less-risky tangible assets than by risky intangible assets. Thus, our analysis suggests that the degree of accounting conservatism is positively associated with the strength of balance sheet (represented by the level of tangible assets).
We further extend our analysis to incorporate the real eects of accounting conservatism. In pursuit of this goal, we suppose that this eort can be taken either by the entrepreneur before contracting with the debtholder or by the debtholder after the project is funded. On top of the existing adverse selection problem, eort ineciency may result from the non-contractibility (a moral hazard problem) and from the asymmetric payo structures between the debtholder and the entrepreneur. On the one hand, since the high-type entrepreneur intends to signal her type via conservatism, she cannot fully endogenize the benet of additional eort; as a result, her eort decision is downward distorted. On the other hand, because the debtholder receives a xed payment irrespective of the level of realized project return when the project is successful, the debtholder tends to put more attention on the liquidation value while making her eort decision. Overall, we observe that accounting conservatism may not only have adverse selection eects on the entrepreneur's payo, but also have incentive eects on the eort decisions.
We can also articulate the dierence between the conditional and unconditional conservatism in this signaling context. Following Gigler et al. (2009) , the major dierence is that conditional conservatism imposes more stringent veriability for reporting a good state than for reporting a bad state.
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This distribution function consequently changes the debtholder's required payment and the more risky entrepreneur's incentive to mimic the less risky one. A rather surprising result is that, as conditional conservatism tilts the accounting signal toward reporting the low signal, the distortion required for the signaling purpose may be either alleviated or exacerbated. In Section 4, we provide detailed conditions under which conditional conservatism helps mitigating the signaling cost.
Our model is related to the evidence of conservative accounting choices documented in the literature and in practice. Basu and Waymire (2008) posit that the reason General Electric wrote o its intangible assets in 1907, the rst company intentionally understating intangibles in history, was to signal its nancial position in order to raise external capital. Leftwich (1983) documents that rms typically modify GAAP conservatively in debt contracts. El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990) provide specic examples on how GAAP rules were tailored conservatively for debt contracting (in their Appendix 2). Ahmed and Standford-harris (2002) further nd that rms adopting more conservative accounting incur a lower cost of debt (also see Zhang (2008) ). In practice, when rms adopt conservative accounting choices, debt rating agencies would explicitly address that in their credit reports and assign them with lower risk premium (Glater (2003) and Ward (2002) ). For example, GM, which was known for the most conservative accounting, lost its investment-grade bond rating for adopting liberal accounting rules in 2006 (Norris (2006) ). Finally, Bagnoli and 1 This notion is consistent with Basu (1997) and Watts (2003) who dene accounting conservatism in terms of dierential veriability standards that must be met for measuring and incorporating good and bad news in accounting reports.
2 Conservative accounting choices refer to the situation in which rms adopt more conservative options among allowable options when reporting discretion is exercised (Bagnoli and Watts (2005) ). Watts (2005) argue that in presence of information asymmetry, a conservative accounting choice can be used to infer a manager's private information. In particular, they provide ample evidence of how a manager can communicate its accounting choices to investors and analysts through nancial statements and press releases (see the references cited therein).
Our work adds to the recent debate on accounting conservatism and eciency of debt contract, including Armstrong et al. (2009 ), Gigler et al. (2009 , Guay and Verrecchia (2006) , Li (2009 ), 3 Watts (2003 ), and Zhang (2008 . 4 Our results complement theirs by showing that accounting conservatism can be signaling device in debt contracting and can subsequently gives rise to distortions on capital investment; thus, our results indicate that when the cost of information asymmetry is high, accounting conservatism can improve social welfare. This paper is also related to the accounting literature on signaling games. Fan (2007) and Baldenius and Meng (2009) consider a model in which an entrepreneur intends to signal her private information by oering shares to investors or/and by reporting earnings. Allowing the investors to exert costly eort, they elaborate on how its contractibility aects the investors' eort and mitigate or exacerbate the cost of signaling. Hughes and Schwartz (1988) argue that a FIFO accounting choice can be a credible signal of favorable private information, which leads to an increase in market value of the entrepreneur. Bagnoli and Watts (2005) consider a market setting in which a manager trades o between the market value of a rm and beating earnings expectation. They show that a separating equilibrium can occur when the cost of missing earnings expectations is high. In contrast, we demonstrate that in debt contracting setting, conservative accounting choices can be a signaling mechanism, but the signaling cost is resulted from the dierent payo structures between equityholders and debtholders.
This work is related to various studies in the literature in which accounting conservatism may play a stewardship role in order to mitigate agency costs. Gigler and Hemmer (2001) consider a principal-agent setting in which the agent can make a voluntary disclosure prior to an ex post, noisy earnings report. They nd that the value of communication strictly decreases in the degree of conservatism in the reporting system. Venugopalan (2006) studies a contractual setting in which after an agent has invested, the accounting system generates ex post veriable signals that are 3 Li (2009) allows for renegotiation and nds that when debt covenants are not renegotiable or when renegotiation cost is suciently high, more conservative accounting actually reduces the eciency of debt contracts. In other words, conservatism accounting can be suboptimal for debt holders' perspective.
4 Zhang (2008) empirically nds that conservatism to benet lenders ex post through the timely signaling of default risk, as manifested by accelerated covenant violations, and to benet borrowers ex ante through lower initial interest rates.
correlated with the agent's private information. The analysis shows that if the transfer payments are unbounded, the degree of conservatism in the accounting system is inconsequential and the rstbest investment can be implemented. Chen et al. (2007) show that when accounting information serves both valuation and stewardship purposes, accounting conservatism may eectively reduce a manager's incentive to conduct earnings management. While conservatism makes accounting numbers less valuable for stewardship in their model, our model suggests that conservatism may play an essential role in mitigating agency problems. Kwon et al. (2001) argue that, in the context of moral hazard problem, accounting conservatism may emerge as an optimal solution in the presence of limited liability because it increases the likelihood ratios for higher ex post outcome reports. Raith (2009) studies a two-period moral hazard problem in which a manager can be compensated based on an early signal of a future outcome of his action, or (later) based on the outcome itself. He shows that conservative accrual accounting can be optimal when the manager cannot commit to a long-term contract.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal model. Section 3 provides the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4, we extend our analysis to incorporate the real eects and the conditional conservatism. Section 5 concludes. All the proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
We consider a model in which a risk-neutral entrepreneur owns an asset A and seeks additional funding from a risk-neutral debtholder to nance an investment project. The asset value A is common knowledge. The project requires a cash outlay I > A; thus, if the debtholder agrees to nance the project, her capital funding is D I A. The project is risky and its outcome depends on the state of the world. The entrepreneur can be of two types. A less risky entrepreneur has a probability of success or \Good" state equal to p h ; and the project yields return R h in the case of success and zero in the case of failure or \Bad" state. A risky entrepreneur has a probability of success equal to p l with project return R l , where 0 < p l < p h < 1.
We make two more assumptions to facilitate the analysis. First, a risky project yields higher return R l in the case of success than a less risky one R . This assumption reects the nature that a less risky project has a higher probability of success and yet yields lower return than does a more risky project. 5 Second, we assume the expected return of a good project is higher than that of a bad project (p
. This is reminiscent of the classical Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition commonly adopted in the signaling literature (see, e.g., Baldenius and Meng (2009), Fan (2007) , and Spence (1973) ). Thus from the perspective of the debtholder, the investment project owned by the high-type entrepreneur is more desirable.
We conveniently label the entrepreneur who observes p h as a high type, and the entrepreneur who observes p l as a low type. The debtholder has no access to the entrepreneur's type; from her perspective, the high type and low type arise with the prior probabilities and 1 , respectively (0 < < 1). The capital market is assumed to be competitive in the sense that the debtholder demands an expected rate of return normalized to zero. Facing such an adverse selection problem, the entrepreneur should rely on other sources of information in order to determine whether to nance the project.
In our model, there exists an accounting system that can generate, after the project is funded, one of two possible signals: S H or S L . These signals are informative about the state of project return; thus, the debtholder may rely on the accounting system to mitigate the information asymmetry problem. Given the states of the world, the accounting system generates the signals with the following conditional probabilities: P (S H jG) = + ; and P (S L jG) = 1 ;
(1) P (S H jB) = ; and P (S L jB) = 1 ; where 0 1 and 0 1 to ensure that the conditional probabilities are well-behaved. The above specication is consistent with the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP).
6
The informativeness of the signals crucially depends on the two parameters and . First, the posterior probabilities are given by P (GjS H ) = [( + )]=( + ) and P (BjS L ) = [(1 )(1 )]=(1 ). The parameter represents an index of unconditional conservatism in the manner of Venugopalan (2006) and Gigler et al. (2009) . When is lower, the accounting system is more likely to report S L ; irrespective of the state of nature. Thus a decreases in makes the accounting system more conservative unconditionally. This suggests that unconditional conservatism makes 5 Moreover, as we demonstrate in Section 3, this condition is required if the entrepreneur intends to distinguish herself from others. 6 Given the binary nature of the accounting signal, MLRP is equivalent to the condition that the likelihood of obtaining the signal SH is higher when the state is Good than when the state is Bad, i.e., P (SHjG) > P (SHjB). 7 One can verify that the parameter satises those four conditions in Gigler et al. (2009) under which un- the accounting system more informative at the top end (signal S H ) and less informative at the bottom end (signal S L ). In contrast, the parameter captures the degree of informativeness in the accounting system. This is because an increase in decreases the \error" associated with signal S H when the state is G, but leaves the \error" associated with signal S L unchanged when the state is B.
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A graphic illustration of these probabilities (for an exogenously given conservatism level ) is provided in Figure 1 .
When contracting with the investors, the entrepreneur intends to choose the degrees of unconditional conservatism in order to overcome the adverse selection problem.
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The entrepreneur can only signal her type through the choice of unconditional conservatism, , and the informativeness regarding the accounting signal is not aected by her decision, i.e., = . The selection of is made public and serves as a signaling device for the entrepreneur to convey her private information. In response, the debtholder determines whether to fund the project and the nancing is modelled as a debt contract that is specied as follows. If the project is indeed funded, the accounting system reports a signal before the project return is realized, and such a signal allows the contracting parties to liquidate the project before the potential project failure is realized. We assume that upon receiving a low signal S L ; the project is liquidated and the debtholder receives an asset value C i , leaving the entrepreneur empty-handed. This assumption seems to be appropriate as in practice the debtholder typically liquidates the project after an inuential bad news is announced. On the other hand, if a high signal S H is reported, the debtholder continues holding the project and the project return (either successful or unsuccessful) is realized.
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We further assume that the conditional conservatism can be represented statistically. The condition (A1) is satised: P (SHjG; )=P (SHjB; ) = ( + )= > 1 and P (SLjG; )=P (SLjB; ) = (1 )= (1 ) Venugopalan (2006) and Gigler et al. (2009) and the references therein. 10 The analysis of conditional conservatism is deferred to Section 5.2. 11 We abstract away the issues related to debt covenants and focus on analyzing whether accounting conservatism can be a signaling device. In this binary-signal setting, we simply assume that when the accounting signal is low, a debt covenant will be binding, thereby triggering liquidation. One can further assume that upon observing a low signal, the investor, with some probabilities, may determine whether to liquidate the project or not. Our results are not sensible to this assumption, as long as that probability of liquidating the project is common knowledge. Nevertheless, we also acknowledge that in a continuous setting, the relation between debt covenants and conservatism is more subtle if conservatism does not take the form of a downward monotone transformation of accounting signal (see Gigler et al. high-type (less risky) entrepreneur's project generates liquidation value higher than the low-type entrepreneur's C h > C l . Thus, the liquidation value is negatively associated with the riskiness of the project. In addition, the project return shall be suciently large p i R i > C i for all i P fh; lg, so that the funding is always desirable for both types of entrepreneurs. If the project is successful, the debtholder receives a xed payment F (based on the market rate) and the entrepreneur retains the residual value R F: However, if the project is unsuccessful, both parties receive nothing.
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning, the entrepreneur privately observes the probability of success (i.e., her type). She then proposes a level of accounting conservatism and a required funding D = I A to the debtholder. Based on this signal, the debtholder updates her belief about the expected return of the project and evaluates whether to fund the project. If the debtholder decides not to fund the project, the game ends and each party receives a null payo. On the other hand, if the project is funded (and thus implemented), the debtholder requests a xed payment F that is collected contingent upon the non-liquidated successful project. The accounting system reports the signal following the level of conservatism ( or ) proposed by the entrepreneur. If the signal is low S L ; the project is liquidated and the debtholder receives a xed liquidation value C i ; and the game ends. Otherwise, the project continues until its return is realized; the debtholder and the entrepreneur receive the payments in accordance with the debt contract. In Figure 2 , we briey summarize the sequence of events.
Given the aforementioned accounting system and the nancial contract, we can express their corresponding payos explicitly as follows. Suppose that the entrepreneur has chosen a pair of conservatism parameters (, ) and assume that the debtholder funds the project. In such a scenario, the entrepreneur collects the residual value of the project if and only if the project is not liquidated and eventually turns out to be successful. Thus, the entrepreneur obtains
where p i (+) corresponds to the probability of seeing a non-liquidated successful project, (R F i ) is the net payo the entrepreneur obtains after paying back F i to the debtholder, and A is the cash commitment out of the entrepreneur's pocket.
The debtholder's payo, upon funding the project, depends on the probability of success that is the entrepreneur's private information. The debtholder's expected payo from contracting with a type-i entrepreneur is
The rst term of (3) represents the expected xed repayment when the project is successful. The second and third terms correspond to the cases in which the accounting system report a low signal S L when the state is "Good" and "Bad", respectively. The last term is the cash investment to facilitate the project.
Since the game involves multi-period interactions with incomplete information, we adopt the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) as our solution concept (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) ). In the next section, we characterize the equilibrium behavior.Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium behavior. We rst start with the benchmark case in which no information asymmetry is involved; following this, we then turn to the scenario in which the entrepreneur privately knows the project return.
Equilibrium analysis
Complete information benchmark
Under complete information, the debtholder is able to dierentiate the entrepreneur's type. When the debtholder funds a type-i entrepreneur, the joint expected payo, denoted by W; is
for any given , . The rst-order condition indicates that, @W=@ = p ]. Then, the optimal levels of informativeness and accounting conservatism are = and = 1 , respectively. That is, the debtholder prefers to have the accounting system as informative as possible. This result is not surprising; as the expected project return is larger than the liquidation value, i.e., p
, the debtholder does not have any incentive to liquidate the project ex ante. But, if the state is not favorable, the debtholder wants to liquidate the project before the outcome is realized. The accounting system reports S H with the maximum probability when the state is "Good" and S L with the minimum probability = 1 when the state is "Bad". We summarize our results in the following lemma.
12 Lemma 1. If the debtholder can observe the entrepreneur's type, the accounting system exhibits extreme unconditional conservatism, that is, = 1 and = .
4 Information Asymmetry
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium behavior. Our primary interest is in the possibility of nding a \separating equilibrium" in which the high-type entrepreneur and the low-type entrepreneur intend to select dierent levels of conservatism. In such an equilibrium, the selection of conservatism is perfectly informative and the debtholder is able to infer the entrepreneur's type directly from her choice.
Under information asymmetry about the protability of success, the debtholder is unable to oer dierent amounts of investment to dierent types of entrepreneurs, unless the choice of accounting conservatism acts as a self-selection mechanism. We rst consider the unconditional conservatism and keep informativeness at a constant, i.e., = . The entrepreneur can only signal her type through the choice of the unconditional conservatism, . Our goals in this section, are two-fold. First, we want to investigate whether such signaling is possible; second, if it is possible, how should the high-type entrepreneur choose the appropriate unconditional conservatism in order to successfully distinguish herself (from the low-type entrepreneur) and at the same time maximize her expected payo. , the debtholder naively believes that she faces a low-type entrepreneur. Since our goal is to investigate the possibility of sustaining a separating equilibrium, it is appropriate to adopt such a \most supportive" belief system.
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Given this belief system, we can obtain the debtholder's optimal strategy. Upon agreeing to fund the project, the debtholder requests a xed payment that makes her break even in a competitive market. Thus, having observed the conservatism level i , she believes that the contract is oered by a type-i entrepreneur and consequently her expected payo is
The break-even condition gives rise to the xed payment in equilibrium as follows:
Unconditional conservatism has two eects on the xed payment. When the system is more conservative (i.e. i is lower), it increases the probability of liquidating the project. Consequently, the expected liquidating value is higher and the expected project return is lower. The eect of unconditional conservatism on the payment is uncertain. It is shown that when the latter eect is stronger than the former one, the xed payment increases in the level of unconditional conservatism (i.e., dF ( i )=d i 0). 14 Given the equilibrium xed payment schedule, we now investigate the entrepreneur's problem. Suppose that a type-i entrepreneur follows the equilibrium strategy and selects the conservatism level i , her expected payo is
However, if she chooses an alternative conservatism level
, her expected payo becomes
13 It is the most supportive belief since this provides the maximum exibility to sustain an equilibrium (by punishing any undesirable deviation).
14 This condition is satised when the liquidation value C i is suciently smaller than the capital funding by the investor, that is, dF ( 
In equilibrium, a type-i entrepreneur is induced to select the conservatism level i , and thus the following incentive compatibility constraint must be satised. Incentive compatibility does not necessarily imply that the entrepreneur reveals her type through the level of unconditional conservatism. To address this issue, we should look for the equilibrium in which the high-type entrepreneur and the low-type entrepreneur willingly choose dierent levels of unconditional conservatism, i.e., h T = l . In such a scenario, the debtholder is able to identify the entrepreneur by observing the chosen level of unconditional conservatism. In the terminology of game theory, such an equilibrium is called a \separating equilibrium" (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) It is straightforward to verify the necessary and sucient conditions under which a separating equilibrium can be sustained. The condition is specied in the following proposition. Proposition 1. Suppose that the entrepreneur can signal her type through the level of unconditional conservatism. A separating equilibrium exists if and only if the following condition holds:
Proposition 1 identies the conditions under which the high-type entrepreneur can successfully signal her type. This is built upon the observation that it is relatively less costly for her to commit to unconditional conservative accounting than the low-type entrepreneur.
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It can be veried that when information is complete, the entrepreneur has no incentive to handicap herself by enforcing unconditional conservatism. However, in the presence of information asymmetry, the low-type entrepreneur might have an incentive to misreport her type by committing h < 1 , for now the debtholder would ask for a lower repayment. In the condition identied in Proposition 1, the rst inequality of (5) ensures that when the high-type entrepreneur commits h , her expected payo is not lower than that when she is perceived as a low-type. The second inequality adds another constraint under which the low-type entrepreneur does not benet from pledging h in order to mimic the high-type one.
From (5), we observe that a necessary condition for this inequality to hold is that the project return in case of success for the low-type entrepreneur R l is higher than that for the high-type entrepreneur (R l > R h ) (see the denominator of (5) It is worth mentioning that this condition is dierent from the classical single-crossing condition, which in our context translates to the ordering over the expected return p
) is endogenously derived from the debtholder's unique payo structure in this debt contracting setting. In contrast, in most of signaling papers, the expected payments/ transfers are made only contingent on the selection of the signaling tools (see, e.g., Baldenius and Meng (2009), Fan (2007) , and Spence (1973) ).
Let us now proceed to characterize the equilibrium behavior assuming that such a separating equilibrium exists. As in the case of models with costly signals, given the conditions in Proposition 1, there are multiple (in fact, a continuum of) equilibria in our context. Thus, to be able to provide an unambiguous prediction of how the entrepreneur would behave, we have to adopt some \renement" to select among the multiple equilibria. The renement is the criterion according to which one equilibrium is more believable than others. Following the convention of the corporate nance literature, we adopt the ecient (or Pareto-dominant) signaling equilibrium concept for which the level of unconditional conservatism is the least costly (or the most ecient) from the high-type entrepreneur's perspective. This renement rules out all those separating equilibria in which the high-type entrepreneur uses other inecient or unnecessarily distorted signaling (see Fan (2007) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) ). This approach is appropriate for our purpose because the 16 An alternative way to interpret this result is to look at the entrepreneur's marginal utility while varying the conservatism level. Recall that the single-crossing condition follows from the local incentive compatibility constraint. In the appendix, we provide the mathematical derivations for this marginal utility argument and show why condition R l > R h is required in our context. entrepreneur has the discretion of choosing her conservatism level (see more discussions in (Tirole, 2006, Chapter 6) In an ecient separating equilibrium, the high-type entrepreneur's problem is to nd the level of unconditional conservatism that maximizes her expected payo:
where
) guarantees that the low-type entrepreneur has no incentive to mimic the high type. We summarize the equilibrium behavior in the following corollary. Corollary 1. Suppose that the entrepreneur can signal her type through the level of unconditional conservatism and condition (5) holds. In an ecient separating equilibrium,
Corollary 1 clearly demonstrates that the high-type entrepreneur increases the level of unconditional conservatism in order to signal her type ( h < l ) .In this case, the low-type nds it suboptimal to mimic the high-type one and chooses a less conservative accounting system l instead. We now turn to characterize the determinants of the level of unconditional conservatism in order to provide some testable empirical hypotheses.
First, the information asymmetry is certainly the main reason why the high-type entrepreneur will choose conservative accounting. The ratio in (7) Second, the level of unconditional conservatism increases in the amount of capital borrowing D I A (@ h =@D < 0). In this model, the capital funding takes the form of debt nancing, because the debtholder will receive a xed payment when the project is successful. When the entrepreneur requires more leverage, she needs to repay the debtholder a higher xed payment . This suggests that holding the xed payment constant, when the amount of leverage D is higher, the entrepreneur needs to make the accounting system more conservative in order to signal her type. In addition, one may consider the entrepreneur as an equityholder of the project. If the entrepreneur can successfully signal her type, the hightype entrepreneur's expected utility (or the value of equity) is larger than the low-type one'
). This result suggests that accounting conservatism is negatively correlated with a rm's debt-to-equity ratio.
Third, since signaling through accounting conservatism is costly, it is intuitive that the degree of conservatism depends on the nancial strength of the entrepreneur. In our model, the nancial strength is represented by two parameters: the project return R i and the liquidation value C i . Higher project return R l makes it more costly for the low-type entrepreneur to imitate the hightype by committing h . As shown by the denominator in (7), when accounting is more conservative, the project is more likely to be liquidated. Consequently, it reduces the low-type entrepreneur's expected return (the rst term in the parenthesis) and increases the cost of expected liquidation value (the second term). As the project return R l is higher, the low-type entrepreneur's opportunity cost of liquidating the project is higher. As a result, the high-type entrepreneur decreases unconditional conservatism when R . In other words, a more protable rm tends to choose more conservative accounting.
On the other hand, (7) indicates that the high-type entrepreneur must increase unconditional conservatism when the liquidation value of the less risky project is higher (@ h =@C h < 0). A high liquidation value C h reduces the repayment F ( h ), thereby increasing the low-type entrepreneur's incentive to imitate the high-type one. Thus, a more conservative accounting must be utilized in order to mitigate this incentive. In contrast, as C l plays an opposite role to C h , the high-type entrepreneur reduces unconditional conservatism when the liquidation value of the low-type project is higher (@ h =@C l > 0). An empirical implication of this result is as follows. Suppose that the investment project is composed of both tangible and intangible assets. Intangible assets tend to be more risky and have lower liquidation values than tangible assets do. This assumption implies that the investment project owned by the high-type entrepreneur should exhibit a larger portion of tangible assets. In other words, the liquidation value C h can serve as a proxy for the strength of the rm's balance sheet. This suggests that rms with stronger strength of balance sheet tend to commit to more conservative accounting in order to signal their types.
We summarize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the entrepreneur can signal her type through the level of unconditional conservatism and the condition (5) holds. In an ecient separating equilibrium, the level of unconditional conservatism increases in the extent of information asymmetry (@ h =@p l > 0), increases in the capital borrowing (@ h =@D < 0), decreases in the project return of the low-type entrepreneur (@ h =@R l > 0), and increases in the liquidation value of the high-type project (@ h =@C h < 0).
Extensions
In this section, we discuss some variants of our model characteristics.
Real Eects
Our primary goal in this section is to illustrate that if either the entrepreneur or the debtholder can engage in real activities such as costly eort (or costly investment) to improve the project return, accounting conservatism may not only have adverse selection eects on the entrepreneur's payo but also incentive eects on the eort decisions. To elaborate on this, suppose that the eort decision can be made by the entrepreneur before contracting with the debtholder or by the debtholder after the project is funded. When the choices of eort are not contractible, a moral hazard problem arises on top of the existing information asymmetry problem.
Furthermore, due to the asymmetric payo structures between the debtholder and the entrepreneur, the moral hazard issue regarding the eort decisions has dierent implications. On the one hand, as the project may be liquidated due to conservative accounting, the entrepreneur cannot fully endogenize the benet of additional eort, which results in a downward distortion. On the other hand, when the debtholder makes an eort decision, she cannot fully benet from the eort. This is because if the project is successful, she will receive only a xed payment irrespective of the realized project return (under the assumption that the project return is suciently large). This suggests that the debtholder's incentive to make eort is stronger when she knows the entrepreneur is of low type. The conict of interest between the entrepreneur and the debtholder further complicates this moral hazard problem. By whom the eort decision is made aects both parties' expected payos and in turn, the entrepreneur's choice of accounting conservatism. To illustrate this eect, we now assume that the realized project return R i and the liquidation value C i are determined by the entrepreneur's type as well as the entrepreneur's eort decision or the debtholder's eort decision. Below, we discuss these two scenarios accordingly.
Entrepreneur's eort
Let us rst consider the situation in which the entrepreneur is able to exert eort decision. In such a scenario, if the eort level of the type-i entrepreneur is k, then the corresponding project return becomes R Based on the above model characteristics, we can characterize the real eects in the context of conservatism signaling, assuming that a separating equilibrium can be sustained.
When the entrepreneur's eort is not observable, she can only rely on the conservatism level to convey her type. This makes the signaling more dicult, as the debtholder must infer from the entrepreneur's conservatism level not only her type (regarding the project protability) but also her eort decision. Denote by h the conservatism level the high-type entrepreneur chooses in a separating equilibrium. If the entrepreneur species a dierent conservatism level T = h , the debtholder's expected payo given her belief is
where k() is the entrepreneur's optimal eort level (from the debtholder's perspective). This leads to the equilibrium xed payment F () such that the debtholder's payo is break-even, i.e., U I () = 0: Likewise, when the debtholder observes h , her payo function is given by
and the corresponding equilibrium xed payment, F ( h ); makes her payo function break-even (U I ( h ) = 0). 17 This eort can take on numerous forms such as exerting personally costly eorts, identifying investment opportunities or supplying critical assets in order to operationalize the project. Our analysis is intended to highlight the eect of eort decisions in general and thus we assume away specic forms of eorts.
18 Note that the entrepreneur is endowed with an asset value A before contracting with the investor. The disutility cost of eort can be covered by the asset value.
Suppose that a type-i entrepreneur follows the equilibrium strategy and selects the conservatism level , her expected payo is
In equilibrium, the debtholder's rational expectation regarding k( h ) must be consistent with the entrepreneur's optimal eort decision. Thus, we obtain the following moral hazard constraint: 
Likewise, we can formulate the low-type entrepreneur's problem.
The ecient signaling equilibrium can be characterized by the following problem: (8) and (9)g:
From the above formulation, we observe that when the eort is not contractible, the incentive issues become more pronounced, as both the moral hazard and adverse selection problems are present. Based on this formulation, we can articulate the interdependence between the conservatism level and the entrepreneur's eort decision and summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the entrepreneur can invest to improve the project return. In a separating equilibrium, the induced eort levels by the high-type and low-type entrepreneurs, denoted by k h and k l respectively, are determined by the following equations:
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal eort is obtained when the marginal benet of eort (the left-hand side of (10)) equals to the marginal cost of eort (the right-hand side of (10)). To shed light on the eect of accounting conservatism on the entrepreneur's eort, recall that in the absence of information asymmetry, the ecient eort levels can be characterized by p
), where i = h; l: Eq. (10) illustrates that the incentive to signal the project quality not only aects the conservatism level, but also the real eort decision that the high-type entrepreneur undertakes. In the presence of information asymmetry, the high-type entrepreneur intends to signal her type through conservative accounting (thus h < 1). Because the project will not be liquidated with a probability + h only, the entrepreneur cannot fully recoup the benet of costly eort. Consequently, as the marginal benet of costly eort is lower, the entrepreneur reduces eort level. In contrast, there is no downward distortion on the low-type entrepreneur's eort k l , for in a separating equilibrium the low-type entrepreneur has no incentive to commit accounting conservatism.
The analysis thus far hinges on the assumption of non-contractible eort. A natural question is what if the eort decision is contractible? In such a scenario, the entrepreneur can, in addition to the conservatism level, declare her eort decision to signal her type. Thus, the high-type entrepreneur can simultaneously use two signaling devices to separate herself from the low-type one. Formally, we can formulate the equilibrium behaviors in an ecient separating equilibrium as follows. Denote by ( h ; k h ) the high-type entrepreneur's choice in a separating equilibrium. To sustain ( h ; k h ) in a separating equilibrium, we must ensure the following incentive compatibility constraints:
And the ecient signaling equilibrium can be characterized by the following problem:
The fact that the high-type entrepreneur can select the pair (k; ) indicates the aforementioned two signal devices. Since our primary focus is on the intertwined adverse selection and moral hazard problems, we omit the detailed derivations of the separating equilibrium and proceed to the case in which the eort decision is made by the debtholder. 
Debtholder's eort
We now turn to the case in which the debtholder can exert costly eort after the project is funded. The debtholder, for example, may intervene operating activities so as to increase the value of assets in place through active monitoring of management. Suppose that after the debtholder exert level of unobservable eort k. The benet of debtholder activism will be reected by higher project return and liquidation value R , the debtholder's expected payo, given her belief, is
Since the eort decision is not observable, we need to consider the incentive compatibility constraint,
The rst-order condition shows that k() is characterized by
A higher eort increases the expected liquidation value (the left side of (12)) and the marginal cost of eort (the right side of (12)).
In equilibrium, the high-type entrepreneur is induced to select the conservatism level h , thereby leading to the following incentive compatibility constraint: In other words, the high-type entrepreneur rst makes a conjecture on the debtholder's optimal eort decision k( h ) and then chooses the degree of accounting conservatism in order to distinguish herself from the low-type one. The following proposition characterize the induced eort decisions when a separating equilibrium exists.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the debtholder can invest to improve the project return. In a separating equilibrium, the induced eort levels by the high-type and low-type entrepreneurs, denoted by Proposition 4 clearly indicates that the distortion of the debtholder's eort decision is driven by two factors: the dierent payo structures between the two parties and the cost of information asymmetry. First, because of the structure of debt contract, the debtholder receives a xed payment when the project is successful. Thus, the marginal benet of eort comes from the higher liquidation value rather than the project return. Second, recall that in the absence of asymmetric information, accounting conservatism is not necessary and the ecient eort levels can be characterized by
, where i = h; l: As the high-type entrepreneur intends to signal her high return, the accounting system is distorted more conservatively h > 0; this constitutes an additional source of ineciency. One interesting result of Proposition 4 is that as accounting conservatism increases the probability of liquidating the project, it reduces the debtholder's incentive to exert eort. In contrast, accounting conservatism does not aect the choice of eort on the low-type entrepreneur k l I .
Conditional conservatism
In our basic model, we explicitly assume that the only way for the high-type entrepreneur to separate from the low-type one is to commit unconditional conservatism by assuming that the informativeness of the accounting system is limited by . Could the entrepreneur signal her type through conditional conservatism? We investigate this possibility in this section. The major difference between unconditional and conditional conservatism is that in the former case, the change in the distribution of signals is not independent of the underlying state. Specically, consider an accounting system that can generate, after the project is funded, one of two possible signals: S H or S L . Given the states of the world, the accounting system generates the signals with the following conditional probabilities: P (S H jG) = + ; and P (S L jG) = 1 ; P (S H jB) = c(); and P (S L jB) = 1 c(); where 0 1; 0 1 . This information structure is dierent from (1) 
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We assume that the informativeness of the accounting system is xed at a constant, i.e., = . The entrepreneur can only signal her type through the choice of conditional conservatism and c(). We intend to investigate whether such signaling is possible and how the high-type entrepreneur's choice of is dierent from that under unconditional conservatism.
Let us rst briey characterize the optimal unconditional conservatism under complete information. Denote the choice of conditional conservatism as so as to dierentiate unconditional conservatism . The debtholder is able to dierentiate the entrepreneur's type. When the debtholder funds a type-i entrepreneur, the joint expected payo W is for i P fh; lg. This suggests that under complete information, the optimal conditional conservatism is identical to the optimal unconditional conservatism. Remark 1. In the absence of information asymmetry, the optimal conditional conservatism is identical to the optimal unconditional conservatism ( = 1 ).
We once again follow Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and start with the extreme belief system in which the debtholder believes that the entrepreneur is high-type if and only if the entrepreneur selects the conservatism level of sustaining a separating equilibrium, it is appropriate to adopt such a \most supportive" belief system. Given this belief system, we then characterize the debtholder's optimal strategy. Upon agreeing to fund the project, the debtholder requests a xed payment that makes her break even due to the competitive market condition. Thus, having observed the conservatism level i , she believes that a type-i entrepreneur appears and consequently her expected payo is
(14) illustrates that conditional conservatism has asymmetric eects on the payment. When the system is more conservative (i.e., i is lower), it increases the probability of liquidating the project, but its marginal eect is stronger for the good state than for the bad state since c H (
Given the equilibrium xed payment schedule, we now investigate the entrepreneur's problem. Suppose that a type-i entrepreneur follows the equilibrium strategy and selects the conservatism level The major dierence between unconditional and conditional conservatism is that under conditional conservatism regime, the accounting signal is tilted toward reporting the low signal S L with a probability c() (rather than under unconditional conservatism). As shown by (15), this consequently changes the debtholder's required payment and the low-type entrepreneur's incentive to mimic the high-type one. Whether or not the high-type entrepreneur benets more from conditional conservatism depends on the characteristics of the rm. When c( h ) < h , P (S H jB) is lower under conditional conservatism than under unconditional conservatism. This in turn increases the low-type entrepreneur's cost of mimicking the high-type. Thus, the entrepreneur commits to a less conservative accounting in a conditional sense (see the second term of (16)). The dierence is also aected by the on the property of c(). To elaborate on this, consider the impact of an increase in D on unconditional conservatism h . By implicit dierentiation of (16) ). In other words, as the entrepreneur's own internal capital is lower (or the amount of borrowing is higher), the amount of borrowing is higher, and conditional conservatism may give rise to a countervailing eect relatively to unconditional conservatism on the amount of capital borrowing.
Concluding Remarks and Discussions
Empirical studies have suggested that rms that report more conservatively are charged a lower interest rate. In this paper, we provide another explanation for the negative association between lower interest rates and conservatism accounting. We argue that the prospect of signaling project return may give rise to the demand for conservative accounting, even though it may not necessarily improve contracting eciency ex post. Thus, the negative correlation between lower interest rates and conservative accounting may be explained by the heterogeneity of rms, such as riskiness and leverage.
We further extend our analysis to incorporate the real eects of accounting conservatism. We consider two scenarios in which this eort can be taken either by the entrepreneur before contracting with the debtholder or by the debtholder after the project is funded. On top of the existing information asymmetry problem, eort ineciency may result from the non-contractibility and from the asymmetric payo structures between the debtholder and the entrepreneur. We show that accounting conservatism may not only have adverse selection eects on the entrepreneur's payo, but also incentive eects on the eort decisions. Finally, we nd that, compared to the uncondition conservatism, conditional conservatism may either alleviate or amplify the distortion required for the signaling purpose. Overall, our results speak to the strategic role for accounting conservatism in the context of debt contracting.
Several extensions are in order. Debt covenants are designed to reduce a variety of the agency costs. In this study, we focus on the positive covenants by which control right shifts to debtholders in the case of mediocre performance. Recall that accounting conservatism determines the link between future project return and accounting signals on which debt covenants are based. Thus, if debt covenants do incorporate the nature of accounting conservatism, researchers may observe a positive relation between the tightness of debt covenants and accounting conservatism (see Guay and Verrecchia (2006) and Beatty (2008) ). However, it is also possible that debtholders may stipulate negative covenants by which rms for example are restricted to taking more risky investments, paying dividend payments to shareholders or issuing more junior debts. In this case, the connection between debt covenants and accounting conservatism may not be straightforward. It is not clear how accounting conservatism we study herein would be aected by this form of negative debt covenants.
The main insight of this paper is that the high-type entrepreneur may reveal her private information by self-selecting accounting conservatism in debt contracting (which is not necessary under information symmetry). However, the potential problem with these choices of accounting conservatism is that the high-type entrepreneur may want to initiate renegotiation before the actual outcome is realized (but after accounting conservatism has been contracted and the audit report is released). It is conceivable that this renegotiation would improve the debtholder's payo regardless of her beliefs about the entrepreneur's type and would also increase the entrepreneur's payo. Nevertheless, the low-type entrepreneur will foresee this possibility of renegotiation and therefore will prefer to initially choose conservative accounting as well, which results in breakdown of the proposed equilibrium. Ex post renegotiations may signicantly alter the ex ante incentives of the entrepreneur and the debtholder and ultimately lead to dierent equilibrium outcomes. Alternatively, if the entrepreneur, after signing the contract, observes favorable market information (such as a lower interest rate of borrowing), she may initiate another debt contract with a new debtholder and use the proceeds to retire the old debt. This could allow the entrepreneur to benet from better market conditions, and consequently she may be willing to commit to the original contract without renegotiation.
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Our model can be extended to examine whether the entrepreneur will be able to signal her type by accounting conservatism when the capital is raised as a form of equity nancing. As we illustrate in the paper, when debt covenants are held constant, accounting conservatism may increase the probabilities of liquidating investment projects, which lowers an entrepreneur's payo signicantly and her incentive to make eort. In contrast, under equity nancing, an entrepreneur and an debtholder (as a shareholder) will share future project return together and the control right of a rm will not be shifted to the debtholder. Accounting conservatism may change the information content of accounting reports on which a rm's stock prices are traded, but it does not aect directly on a rm's liquidity (i.e., there is no dierence between two parties' payo structures). Indeed, Bagnoli and Watts (2005) consider a market setting in which a manager trades o between the market value of a rm and beating earnings expectation. They show that when the cost of missing earnings expectations are high, a separating equilibrium can occur. Our study complements theirs by showing the eect of accounting conservatism in debt contracting. Naturally, it would be interesting to study the impact of accounting conservatism when a rm are funded by a combination of debt and equity nancing. How would the trade-o between liquidity and equity value aect the choices of accounting conservatism? This analysis may add more insights on the debate over the debt-contract theory (see Watts (2003) , Ball et al. (2008) , and Gigler et al. (2009) ).
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In this proof, we derive the condition under which the low-type entrepreneur has an incentive to mimic the high-type entrepreneur. Under complete information, the degree of conservatism is given by Proof of Proposition 1. Our strategy is to rst identify the necessary incentive compatibility constraints for the entrepreneur and the debtholder in a separating equilibrium. Following this, we then characterize the necessary and sucient conditions under which the separating equilibrium can be sustained.
Recall that if the entrepreneur species a dierent conservatism level T = h , the debtholder's expected payo given her belief is
which leads to the equilibrium xed payment
Having obtained the equilibrium xed payment schedule, we now investigate the entrepreneur's problem. Suppose that a high-type entrepreneur follows the equilibrium strategy and selects the conservatism level
Note that even if in the debtholder's mind the entrepreneur is low-type, while calculating the entrepreneur's expected payo, she knows that the true probability of success is p h rather than p l . In equilibrium, the high-type entrepreneur is induced to select the conservatism level h . Thus, the following incentive compatibility constraint must hold:
) is strictly increasing in . Thus, the entrepreneur will choose the maximum = 1 and the above incentive compatibility constraint can be further simplied as follows:
Similarly, we can also articulate the low-type entrepreneur's best strategy. If the low-type entrepreneur chooses a conservatism level T = h , her expected payo is
The high-type entrepreneur's problem can be expressed as follows:
The objective function is increasing in h . Thus, the constraint (IC-L) is binding at optimality, which gives rise to the formula for In equilibrium, the high-type entrepreneur is induced to select the conservatism level h . Thus, the following incentive compatibility constraint must hold: In equilibrium, the low-type entrepreneur should nd it suboptimal to misrepresent herself: U Note that even if in the debtholder's mind the entrepreneur is low-type, while calculating the entrepreneur's expected payo, she knows that the true probability of success is p h rather than p l . In equilibrium, the high-type entrepreneur is induced to select the conservatism level h . Thus, the following incentive compatibility constraint must hold: 
